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I. Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Lynn Schwab ("Schwab") appeals from the District Court's denial 
of his Motion in Limine seeking to exclude a 1998 Montana driving under the 
influence ("DUI") conviction from being used to enhance a later DUI charge to a 
felony in Idaho. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On November 23, 2010, the Respondent, state of Idaho (" State"), charged 
Schwab by Information with felony Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the 
Influence of Alcohol (two or more within ten years), pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 
18-8004, 8005(6).1 R., pp. 32-33. The "two or more within ten years" charging 
enhancement is based, in part, on Defendant's Montana record, which contains a 
conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol #2. R., p. 74. 
1 Section 8005(6) provides that "any person who pleads guilty to or is found 
guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004( 1)( a), (b) or (c), Idaho 
Code, who previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or 
more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, 
. 
or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination 
thereof, within ten (10) years, notwithstanding the form of the jUdgment(s) or 
withheld judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony." (Emphasis added). 
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On January 3, 2011, Schwab filed a Motion in Limine, seeking to prohibit 
the State from using a Montana DUI conviction for the felony charging 
enhancement in Idaho. R., p. 47. The District Court denied the Motion. R, pp. 
123-29. Schwab entered a conditional plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to 
all three counts in the Information, 2 but reserving the right to appeal the Court's 
denial of his Motion in Limine. R., pp. 142-44. 
On April 7, 2011, the District Court sentenced Schwab on the felony 
conviction at issue on appeal to seven years in prison, consisting of a fixed term of 
two (2) years, followed by an indeterminate term of five (5) years. The Court 
suspended the sentence and placed Schwab on probation for a period of seven 
years. R., pp. 149-53. Schwab does not challenge his sentence in this appeal.3 
On May 16, 2011, Schwab filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the 
District Court's denial of his Motion in Limine. R., pp. 160-61. 
2 The State also charged Schwab in the instant case with driving without a 
driver's license and failure to provide proof of insurance, but those charges are not 
at issue in this appeal. R., p. 32-33. 
3 The District Court also imposed a fine and costs and sentenced Schwab to 
180 terms in jail, with 150 days suspended, on each of the misdemeanor counts, to 
run concurrently with his felony sentence, which included 120 days in jail as part 
of the probationary term. R., pp. 152-53. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
The Idaho DUI offense of conviction, from which Schwab has appealed to 
this Court, occurred on September 30, 2010. R., p. 7. However, it is the facts 
related to an arrest on April 30, 2008 in Montana that are relevant to the issues 
raised on appeal. 
In April of 2008, the state of Montana charged Schwab with DUI, turning 
without proper signal, and driving while suspended. R., p. 65. He appeared in 
Court on May 21, 2008, and was advised of his constitutional rights to be 
represented by an attorney and to have a trial at which he would have the right to 
confront any witnesses called against him. R., pp. 65-66. Schwab entered not 
guilty pleas to the charges and indicated that he hoped to hire his own attorney. R., 
pp. 59, 65. Schwab's mother posted bond for Schwab and he was released from 
custody. R., p. 123-24. The conditions of bail allowed Schwab to leave Montana 
for work-related purposes. R., p. 67. The Montana court did not check the box 
requiring Schwab to "PERSONALLY APPEAR FOR ALL Court appearances" as 
a condition of release on bail, but only required that he personally appear for 
arraignment or trial. Id. (emphasis added). 
3 
The omnibus hearing held in Montana on July 22, 2008 was neither an 
arraignment nor trial. R., pp. 65, 68. At that time, Schwab was working in 
Torrance, California, and did not appear for the hearing.4 R., pp. 59, 68; 124. 
Schwab had not been able to find an attorney he could afford to hire and so no 
counsel appeared for him either. R., p. 59. The Montana court issued a bench 
warrant on June 22, 2008, and a notice of trial was mailed to Schwab at an address 
written in the court file: 1101 Chamberlain St., in Boise, Idaho.5 R., pp. 65, 69, 
124. The District Court found that Schwab had provided this address to the 
Montana court. R., p. 127. The Montana prosecutor, Nancy Rohde, averred that 
"Mr. Schwab's Notice of Bond Forfeiture and his Trial Notice were returned to the 
Court with a yellow stamp indicating the premises were Vacant and Unable to 
4 Although Schwab presented evidence about his reasons for not have 
knowledge about the trial and for his misunderstandings about the proceedings, 
some of which the District Court found not credible, see R., p. 127, even on the 
facts as the District Court found them to be and as filled in from the record where 
the District Court did not make specific findings of fact, Mr. Schwab submits his 
conviction was constitutionally defective and should not be used to enhance his 
Idaho DUI charge. 
S The address provided to the officer at the time of Schwab's arrest was an 
address in Fairfield, Idaho. R., p. 65; 123. The Montana court notices of hearings 
and trials were sent to 1101 Chamberlain Street in Boise, Idaho. R., pp. 68-70, 73. 
The District Court noted that the Chamberlain address is the one written by the 
Montana judge on the Notice to Appear and Complaint (the same document that 
also lists the Fairfield address on the citation issued by the Laurel Police Officer). 
R., p. 65; 124. 
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Forward," and the Idaho District Court cited this fact in the Order on Schwab's 
Motion in Limine. R., pp. 94, 125. 
Nonetheless, the Montana court went forward with the court trial as 
scheduled, on September 9, 2008, without Schwab being present, but there is no 
recording or transcript of those proceedings, nor any minutes from the trial. At 
that uncounseled and unrecorded trial, of which Schwab averred he had received 
no notice, the Montana court found Schwab guilty of the DUI offense (and two 
infractions). R., p. 123. Schwab averred that he was at no time advised that a trial 
might be initiated in his absence, nor did he waive his right to be represented by 
counsel and/or to appear at trial. R., p. 60, at,-r 6. There also is no indication that 
the Court reviewed with Schwab the perils of representing himself if he did not 
secure the representation of counsel. 
It is the use of this un-counseled Montana DUI conviction---obtained at a 
trial held in Schwab's absence---to enhance his present DUI charge to a felony that 
Schwab challenges. Schwab's Motion in Limine requested that the District Court 
prohibit the State from using the conviction to enhance his current DUI charge to a 
felony pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8005. That Motion was denied, and the 
issues raised below are now brought to this Court for review. 
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II. Statement of the Issues 
l. Whether the District Court erred in denying Schwab's Motion in 
Limine where the record does not support a conclusion that the 
Montana Court followed Montana's statutory procedure for trying a 
defendant in a misdemeanor case in abstentia and without counsel? 
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding the State had met its 
burden to demonstrate that Schwab's 2008 Montana DUI conviction, 
used to enhance his Idaho DUI charge to a felony, was 
constitutionally sound? 
III. Argument 
A. Standards of Review 
"This Court defers to the factual findings of the district court unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous," but "exercises free review of the district court's 
application of the relevant law to the facts." City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 
2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006) (citing Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494,496, 975 P.2d 
782, 784 (1999». "Constitutional issues are questions of law over which [the 
Court] also exercisers] free review." Id. See also State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 
91,90 P.3d 314,316 (2004). 
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B. The Burden Was on the State to Demonstrate That no Violation of 
Schwab's Rights Occurred With Respect to the Montana Conviction 
In State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992), "this Court set forth the 
respective burdens for a constitutional challenge to a prior conviction that is used 
to enhance a DUI charge from a misdemeanor to a felony." State v. Co by, 128 
Idaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764 (1996). The State bears the burden of showing the 
existence of the prior conviction. Id. Once the State meets its burden, the 
defendant has "the burden of going forward with some evidence that the conviction 
was constitutionally defective." State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 895, 231 P.3d 532, 
540 (Ct. App. 2010). See also Coby, 128 Idaho at 92, 910 P.2d at 764. "In tum, 
once the defendant raises a triable issue of fact concerning whether he was 
accorded his right to counsel, or that he did not properly waive the right, the 
burden of proof is then upon the state to rebut the defendant's evidence and 
convince the court that no violation of the defendant's rights occurred." Moore, 
148 Idaho at 895, 231 P.3d at 540. 
Here, the District Court concluded that Schwab "provided direct evidence of 
a constitutional infringement of his right to have counsel at his trial" and, therefore, 
the burden was on the State "to convince the court that the 2008 conviction was not 
entered in violation of Schwab's rights." R., p. 126. Thus, the overarching issue 
7 
on appeal can be generally stated as whether the District Court properly 
determined that the State met its burden in this regard. 
C. Montana's Statute Allowing Trial of an Absent Defendant Requires 
the Montana Court To Find Schwab (1) Had Knowledge of the Trial 
Date and (2) Was Voluntarily Absent Before Proceeding With the 
Trial 
Montana, by statute, provides courts with discretion to proceed with a trial in 
a misdemeanor criminal proceeding, without the defendant's presence, "[i]f the 
defendant's counsel is authorized to act on the defendant's behalf . . . or if the 
defendant is not represented by counsel." Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-122 (2)(d). 
However, if the defendant is not represented by counsel, the Court may proceed 
with the trial only "after finding that the defendant had knowledge of the trial date 
and is voluntarily absent." Id. (Emphasis added). There is no indication in the 
Montana state court record that the court made such a finding in Mr. Schwab's 
case. The Montana Clerk of the Court advised that there are no audio recordings 
of the proceedings in the Montana court case. R., p. 62, at , 3. Accordingly, not 
only is there no record that the Montana court made the required finding, but there 
also is no record of what, if any, evidence was presented to support the DUI 
conviction entered against Schwab in his absence. For this reason alone, Schwab 
submits that the State has not, and cannot, demonstrate that his prior conviction in 
absentia was valid. 
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The Order for Conditions of Bail entered in the Montana case directed 
Schwab to personally appear for arraignment and trial, but did not state that he 
must appear for all hearings. R 67. Schwab was absent for one of the "other" 
categories of hearings, the omnibus hearing on July 22, 2008, at which his trial 
date was set. Schwab averred that he did not receive notice of the September 9, 
2008 trial date, R., p. 60, ~ 6, and the notice of trial was returned to the Montana 
court with a stamp indicating that the Chamberlin Street premises were "vacant" 
and they were "unable to fOlWard." R., p. 94, 125. It is unknown whether the 
Montana court considered these facts because there is no record of a deliberative 
process or a finding made under Montana Code § 46-16-122 (2)( d). Schwab 
submits that this finding is one the Montana court is required to make to effect a 
valid conviction upon a trial conducted without the defendant or counsel present 
and it cannot be remedied by the Idaho District Court making those findings in the 
first instance on collateral attack. Considering the record before this Court, there is 
not sufficient evidence to find that the Montana court followed the procedure 
required by Montana law. 
D. The Constitutions of the United States and Idaho Establish an 
Accused's Rights to Due Process, the Assistance of Counsel, and to 
be Present at Trial 
Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial ... 
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and to appear and defend in person and with counsel. No person shall be ... 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." (Emphasis 
added). See also State v. Miller, l31 Idaho 186,188,953 P.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 
1998). The right of an accused to be present at trial is grounded in the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. United States v. Gagnon, 
470 U.S. 522,526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484,84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). Additionally, a 
defendant has the right to assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and this 
Sixth Amendment right is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
E. The Montana Conviction was Obtained in Violation of Schwab's 
Right to Counsel 
A DUI defendant in Idaho has the right to collaterally attack the 
constitutional validity of a prior DUI conviction if that prior conviction was 
obtained in violation of his right to counsel. State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 94-95, 
90 P 3d 314, 319 (2004). Schwab did not have the assistance of counsel at the trial 
of this matter. Although he had been informed of his right to counsel at his May 
2008 court appearance, he wanted to see if he could afford private counsel before 
seeking a court-appointed attorney. At no time did Defendant waive his right to 
counsel. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1387 (2004) (noting 
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that any Waiver of the right to counsel must "be knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent"). Schwab's entire Montana DUI proceeding was conducted without 
the assistance of counsel. 
Although the District Court agreed that Schwab provided evidence of a 
constitutional infringement of his right to have counsel at his trial, R., p. 126, the 
court determined this did not render his Montana conviction constitutionally 
defective. The District Court, in considering Schwab's Motion in Limine, noted 
that "[p ]resumably if a defendant does not know of his trial date, he could not have 
informed his counsel to be present to represent him." R., p. 126. However, the 
District Court went on to find that "Schwab intentionally provided an incorrect 
mailing address to the court" and his "failure to know of a trial date is directly 
attributable to his efforts to keep himself deliberately ignorant by providing a false 
address." R., p. 127. Schwab disagrees with this finding and notes that a trial was 
not scheduled at his first appearance nor was he told he had to attend all hearings. 
The District Court relied, in part, on a Montana case in discussing this issue. 
See R 126-27 (citing State v. Weaver, 342 Mont. 196, 179 P.3d 532 (2008)). In 
contrast to the Weaver case, Mr. Schwab did not have counsel representing him. 
See Weaver, 342 Mont. at 199,179 P.3d at 535. Weaver's counsel appeared at his 
trial, even though Weaver did not, and the Montana court took into consideration 
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that Weaver had been ordered to maintain contact with his counsel when the court 
determined that Weaver waived his right to be present at trial by keeping himself 
deliberately ignorant and not keeping his "obligation to remain in contact with his 
counsel". Id. at 199-200, 179 P.3d at 536. If Schwab had the benefit of counsel's 
assistance, the facts of this case and Weaver would be more comparable. 
One purpose of the constitutional right to counsel "is to protect an accused 
from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional 
rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). That is precisely what 
occurred here. Schwab's ignorance of how the legal process works, coupled with 
the Montana court's willingness to conduct a trial in abstentia, without keeping a 
record of the trial, resulted in a conviction that now has collateral consequences for 
Schwab in the present case. 
Moreover, Schwab was never informed of the dangers of self-representation 
he faced if he failed to obtain counsel to represent him. Although the Sixth 
Amendment affords "a defendant the right to forego the assistance of counsel and 
to defend himself," State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 633, 167 P.3d 765, 770 
(2007) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975) 
and Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13), "[t]o be valid, a waiver of the right to counsel must 
have been effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." Id. (quoting State v. 
12 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003». This Court examines "the 
totality of the circumstances in detennining whether ... raJ waiver is valid." Id. 
"The State bears the burden to prove that the defendant voluntarily waived his 
Sixth Amendment rights." Id. As this Court discussed in Dalrymple, the United 
States Supreme Court has "stated the defendant must 'be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.'" Id. (citing 422 U.S. at 835, 95 
S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582). Faretta warnings must be given "so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open. '" Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Montana 
court has set forth similar requirements. State v. Colt, 255 Mont. 399, 407, 843 
P.2d 747, 751 (1992) (explaining that what it means that Faretta requires the 
accused "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"). 
Schwab, in effect, was proceeding without counsel when he could not afford an 
attorney to assist him, but he did so with no knowledge of the dangers of self-
representation and without knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to 
counse1.6 
6 The Montana Supreme Court has stated that it "will not engage in 
presumptions of waiver; any waiver of one's constitutional rights must be made 
specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly." State v. Bird, 308 Mont. 75, 81, 43 P.3d 
266, 271 (2002). Schwab recognizes that many courts have held that a waiver of 
the right to counsel can be inferred in some circumstances, see R., pp. 128-29; 
13 
F. Schwab's Montana Conviction is Constitutionally Deficient Because 
it was Obtained in Violation of his Right to Be Present at Critical 
Stages of Criminal Proceedings 
1. The Idaho Constitution and Idaho Law Should Allow Persons 
Convicted of Crimes That are Used for Charging Enhancements to 
Collaterally Attack as Constitutionally Deficient a Conviction 
Obtained at a Trial held in abstentia 
The Idaho Constitution has been read in certain circumstances to provide 
rights more expansive than those provided by the U.S. Constitution. Schwab 
submits that he should be allowed to collaterally attack the Montana conviction 
used to enhance his Idaho DUI charge, based on the denial of his right to be 
present at every critical stage of the trial. State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 873,119 
P.3d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that a defendant has a right to be present 
at every critical stage of the trial); State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 325, 882 P.2d 
978, 980 (Ct. App. 1994). Schwab acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Weber contains language that may be, and has been, read to 
foreclose such a collateral attack under the federal constitution, but submits that 
there is still room for argument under Idaho's Constitutional guarantees. 140 
Idaho 89,90 P.3d 314. 
however, Schwab submits that the circumstances here are too attenuated to allow 
for an inference that he waived his right to counsel. 
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In State v. Weber, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the United States 
Supreme Court had "held that, with the sole exception of convictions obtained in 
violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding 
has no constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state 
convictions used to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA)." Weber, 140 Idaho at 92,90 P.3d at 317 (emphasis added) (citing Custis 
v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994». The 
Idaho Court relied on Custis to determine that "Weber had no right under the 
United States Constitution to collaterally attack the validity of his prior 
misdemeanor DUI convictions because his attack was based on grounds other than 
the denial of counsel." 140 Idaho at 94,90 P.3d at 319 (emphasis added). The 
Court also noted that it could interpret the Idaho Constitution to provide greater 
protection, but had chosen to align with the federal constitutional standard on the 
rights afforded a defendant prior to entering a guilty plea and the propriety of 
placing the burden on the defendant to go forward with proof that a conviction was 
defective because of the denial of some constitutional right. 140 Idaho at 94, 90 
P.3d at 319. This, however, seems to leave open the question of whether the Idaho 
Constitution could provide additional protection for a defendant who has been tried 
in abstentia, without actual notice of the proceeding, as Weber did not raise this 
issue in his appeal. 
15 
Additionally, the Weber court relied on "[t]he policy considerations 
articulated in Custis", see id., some of which are not applicable to the 
circumstances of the present case. For instance, one of the rationales stated in 
Custis to support a distinction between the denial of counsel and claims of 
ineffective assistance of counselor that a plea was not entered knowingly and 
voluntarily, which the Weber court repeated, was "ease of administration." Id. at 
93,90 P.3d. at 318 (discussing Custis). The Custis court explained that "failure to 
appoint counsel at all will generally appear from the judgment roll itself, or from 
an accompanying minute order." Id. Defendant submits that the violation of his 
right to be present at trial is more like the failure to appoint counsel at all than the 
other types of alleged constitutional deficiencies because it is easy to detennine on 
the face of the records whether Schwab was present at trial and whether he 
executed any waiver of his right to be present at trial. 7 
Finally, Defendant notes, for persuasive value, that courts in other 
jurisdictions have recognized the Custis decision involved a federal sentencing law 
7 The Court in Custis explained that the principles expressed "bear extra 
weight in cases in which the prior conviction, such as one challenged by Custis, are 
based on guilty pleas, because when a guilty plea is at issue, 'the concern with 
finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force. '" Id. (quoting 
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 2087, 60 L.Ed.2d 
634 (1979) (footnote and italics omitted)). Defendant notes that he did not enter a 
guilty plea and so is not challenging whether his plea was knowing or voluntary; 
he was tried in the absence of his or counsel's presence. 
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and have declined to apply it to prohibit certain types of collateral attacks on 
convictions for state court purposes. See, e.g., Paschal! v. State, 116 Nev. 911, 913 
n.2, 8 P.3d 851, 852 (2000) (declining "to adopt such a strict rule limiting 
collateral attacks" and noting that the Nevada state court is not bound by the Custis 
decision as it involved a federal sentencing law not at issue in Paschall and 
determining that Custis "merely established the floor for federal constitutional 
purposes as to when collateral attacks of prior convictions may be prohibited"); 
People v. Soto, 46 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1601-1603, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 596 -
597 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1996). 
Most recently, the Montana Supreme Court took up the issue and determined 
that the Custis rule is "less protective of a defendant's due process rights than the 
established Montana law," thus it "decline[ d] to adopt the categorical prohibition 
of the [U.S. Supreme Court[]." State v. Maine, 360 Mont. 182, 255 P.3d 64, 69 
(2011). The Montana Supreme Court explained that the Custis decision was based, 
in part, on the statutory scheme of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, and 
noted other judicial criticism of the "notion of 'jurisdictional' and 
'nonjurisdictional' rights". Id. at 69-71. The Montana court cited this Court's 
decision in State v. Weber, but decided to "adhere to the principle that ... 'the State 
may not use a constitutionally inform conviction to support an enhanced 
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punishment. '" ld. at 73. In reaching its decision to allow a collateral attack to a 
charging enhancement conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
Montana court relied on the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, which 
protects a defendant from being sentenced on misinformation. ld. at 72. Idaho has 
a similar due process protection. See State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385, 195 
P.3d 737, 744 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that "[s]entencing is considered a 
critical stage in the trial process, and the 'constitutional guarantee of due process is 
fully applicable at sentencing'" such that "[r]eliance on materially false 
information at sentencing violates due process and is an abuse of discretion"). 
For all of these reasons, Schwab requests that this Court consider whether 
the Idaho Constitution allows for challenges to convictions used for charging 
enhancements that were secured in the accused's absence from trial. 
2. Schwab's Right to Be Present at Trial Was Violated With Respect to 
his Montana conviction 
"The presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent 
that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his or her absence .... " Walsh, 
141 Idaho at 873, 119 P.3d at 648 (citing Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 
1484, 84 L.Ed.2d at 490). "The United States Supreme Court has held, however, 
that a defendant who was present at the outset of the trial may waive the right to be 
present thereafter by absconding or by otherwise voluntarily absenting himself 
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during the trial." Miller, 131 Idaho 186, 188,953 P.2d 626, 628 (citing Diaz v. 
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912)). 
In the present case, Schwab did not even know a trial was occurring, so he 
did not "break up a trial already commenced." Id. Although the United States 
Supreme Court has addressed the propriety of conducting a trial in abstentia of a 
defendant, see Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 749 (1993), 
the Court addressed the issue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 8 and, 
finding that rule dispositive, did not reach Crosby's Constitutional objection. The 
Supreme Court held that Rule 43 does not permit the trial in absentia of a 
defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial. Idaho has a similar 
procedural safeguard for criminal defendants. See Idaho R. Crim. P. 43(b) 
(providing that "[t]he further progress of the trial to and including the return of the 
verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived 
defendant's right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present ... [i]s 
voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced . ... ") (Emphasis added). 
8 The current version of Rule 43 provides: "A defendant who was initially 
present at trial, or who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, waives the right to 
be present under the following circumstances ... when the defendant is voluntarily 
absent after the trial has begun, regardless of whether the court informed the 
defendant of an obligation to remain during trial .... " Rule 43( c)(1). The rule 
also provides for arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing in a misdemeanor case to 
be held in the defendant's absence, but only with "the defendant's written 
consent." Rule 43(b )(2). 
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In contrast, Montana's statute provides courts with discretion to proceed 
with a trial in a criminal proceeding, without the defendant's presence, "[i]f the 
defendant's counsel is not authorized to act on the defendant's behalf ... or if the 
defendant is not represented by counsel." Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-122 (2)(d). 
However, the Court may do so only "after finding that the defendant had 
knowledge of the trial date and is voluntarily absent." Id. There is no indication in 
the Montana state court record that the court made such a finding in Defendant's 
case, as discussed above. 
Even if evidence existed to support a finding that the Montana court made 
the appropriate finding of knowledge and voluntary absence, Schwab submits that 
commencing a trial in his absence, when he had not appeared for any portion of the 
trial, violates constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to confront 
witnesses, an issue not resolved in the Crosby case. See, e.g., Elliott, 126 Idaho 
323, 325-26, 882 P.2d 978, 980-81 (explaining that Idaho's Rule 43 "essentially 
codifies the constitutional principle enunciated in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 
442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), that a defendant may waive the right to be 
present by voluntarily absenting himself during the trial") (emphasis added». 
Thus, the conviction was secured in violation of Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
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Constitution, which guarantees the right of the accused to be present at trial and 
defend in person and with counsel. 
IV. Conclusion 
Schwab respectfully submits that his 2008 Montana DUI conviction was 
obtained in violation of rights secured by the Idaho and United States Constitutions 
and without the findings required by Montana's statutory scheme for conducting 
trials with a defendant absent. Accordingly, he requests that this Court reverse the 
District Court's denial of his Motion in Limine. 
Dated: September 22, 2011. 
~ ~EK.BL ~ 
Manweiler, Breen, Ball & Hancock, PLLC 
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